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05/30/2018

Quinn Slobodian on Neoliberalism

Quinn Slobodian is a historian of modern German and international history with a focus on North-South politics, social movements, and the intellectual history of neoliberalism.He is the author of Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany, and most recently Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism. Professor Slobodian is the editor […]

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This is KZSU Stanford.
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Welcome to entitled opinions.
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My name is Robert Harrison, and we're coming to you
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from the Stanford campus.
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We're going to be talking about globalists today.
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So here's a question to start out with.
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At what level of interconnection are we globular?
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At the economic level, for sure.
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At the geopolitical level, maybe.
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At the cultural level, not really.
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It becomes increasingly evident when you start thinking about it
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that the world gets globalized only by flattening itself out.
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There's something paradoxical about that,
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or so it seems to me, a flat world wrapping itself
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around a rotund globe.
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But maybe flat is the wrong adjective.
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Earlier today in preparation for this show,
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I decided to look up the word globe just out of curiosity.
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It is a beautiful word, after all.
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And here's one of the older meanings, which
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goes back to the mid-1500s, I quote,
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"Map of the earth or sky drawn on the surface
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of an artificial sphere."
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Is that what globalism means when pundits,
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populists, and politicians throw the term around,
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a network of interconnection on the surface
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of an artificial sphere?
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Are we living these days on such a surface?
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And if so, what lies beneath us in the depths under our feet?
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Now that sounds like a question for entitled opinions
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where we always go deep.
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I'm joined in the studio today by the author of a book
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that's just been published on a topic I know very little about.
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I usually try to avoid doing that.
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Since I'd like to feel that I'm entitled to my opinion
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on any given day, but today is one of those occasions
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where I mostly hear to listen and learn.
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In fact, I'm curious and even intrigued
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by exactly how this show will unfold
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and what exactly we're in for.
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A few weeks ago, I received a query from an editor
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at Harvard University Press asking me
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if I would be interested in having the author of a newly published
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book on the show, the editor sent me the book.
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I looked through it, read the introduction carefully,
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and was intrigued enough to work things out
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so that the author and I could have this on-air conversation
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during his pre-scheduled visit to Stanford.
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So here we are.
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I'm joined in the studio by Quinn Slobodian,
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a professor of history at Wellesley College, whom I met
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for the first time just minutes ago.
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Quinn Slobodian specializes in modern German
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and international history with a focus
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on North-South politics, social movements,
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and the intellectual history of neoliberalism.
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He is the author of Foreign Front, Third World Politics
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in '60s West Germany, which came out in 2012.
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He is also the editor of Comrades of Color,
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East Germany and the Cold War world.
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But it's his new book that interests us today.
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That book is called Globalists, the End of Empire
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and the Birth of Neoliberalism, which just came out
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with Harvard University Press, Quinn Slobodian,
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welcome to entitled opinions.
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- Thank you, I'm happy to be here.
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- So your editor at Harvard, Gregory Cornblur.
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- The publicist, yeah, great cornblur, yeah.
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He mentioned in his first email to me that you're a fan
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of entitled opinions, I don't know if that's true or not.
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But if so, it bodes well.
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- It is.
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- Your new book is in the genre of intellectual history
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and, or at least so it seems to me,
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and that also bodes well.
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We do a lot of that around here.
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And what you set out to do in this book
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is to follow a group of thinkers, quoting you,
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from the ashes of the Habsburg Empire
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to the creation of the World Trade Organization, the WTO,
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and these thinkers who were also economists,
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or theorists of the economy,
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belong to the so-called Geneva School,
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which for you was crucial to the ideology
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and theories of what is known as neoliberalism.
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And members of that school would include Friedrich Hayek,
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Ludwig von Mises, Wilhelm Röpke,
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and Habbler, among others.
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And you were intrigued enough by this school,
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the Geneva School, to devote a very big book
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to its theories about things like the global economy,
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the nation state, the role of international law
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and transnational institutions.
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And we're going to try to think through some of those theories
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today, but first it would be helpful
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for the listeners of this program,
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if you could tell us exactly what neoliberalism means
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or what it refers to.
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- Sure, it's a term that often had to sort of defend itself,
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its own existence as having any kind of validity
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or legitimacy at all.
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And I think what's helpful is to realize
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that it is used in different ways by different scholars.
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So one of the ways that it's used is to describe
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a kind of period of global capitalism,
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beginning in the 1970s with the oil crisis,
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the breakdown of the bread and wood system,
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the move from manufacturing to services
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and especially the rise of finance as a dominant force
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in the global north,
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the introduction of deregulation,
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privatization and liberalization policies in both the north
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and more specifically in the third world
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of the global south after the debt crisis in 1982.
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And a general kind of move to what's called a post-foretest
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or a more immaterial rather than a material economy.
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So that's one way of thinking about neoliberalism
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is it's a kind of time period that embraces
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the world economy beginning in the 1970s or so.
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Another way of looking at it is as a kind of policy package.
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So some of those things I just mentioned,
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deregulation, privatization, which replace
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pre-existing principles of the welfare state
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and redistribution or the principle of solidarity
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with the necessity of constant risk,
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the importance of competition and innovation
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as the sort of load stars of national economic policy.
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And the people like political philosophers,
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for example, Wendy Brown, who have taken the consideration
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of neoliberalism to furthest,
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have started to talk about it as a kind of order
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of normative reason as she calls it,
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or a kind of a new form of subjectivity
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or a different form of being,
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whereby people perceive themselves as vessels
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of human capital that needs to be maximized
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at all times in a kind of a competitive market struggle
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with other human beings.
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This notion introduced by Foucault
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of being the entrepreneur of oneself,
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often as a way that people sort of summarize
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the notion of a neoliberal subjectivity.
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As a historian, I'm a little bit less ambitious
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in my interpretation compared to some of the more
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probing political theoretical approaches to neoliberalism.
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What I look at it as is more as a discrete intellectual
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and political movement,
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the term at self neoliberalism was coined in 1938
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by a group of mostly European economists
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and policymakers and journalists who are gathered in Paris,
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considering in the wake of the Great Depression,
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how one would be forced to renovate or rethink liberalism
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to prevent it from breaking down as it had
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in that course of the Great Depression
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and the First World War.
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So their conclusion was in the 1930s was that the market
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would not take care of itself.
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The capitalism actually required a set of
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extra economic conditions or safeguards
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to prevent the market from undergoing dissolution
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or disintegration as it had in the 1930s.
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So the neo part of neoliberalism for them
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and for me is a kind of actually a break with
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a 19th century less a fair idea
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that the market would take care of itself,
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it would self regulate itself and self direct.
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Rather, there was a new role for politicians,
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policymakers and philosophers,
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which was to rethink the role of the state,
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to defend the economy against corrosive forces such as
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labor unions, empowered populations,
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anti-colonial struggle and things of that sort.
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- So the difference between liberalism and neoliberalism
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fundamentally would be that liberalism would be a lacy
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fair philosophy of the market's self regulating
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and that the states should just get out of the way.
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And in fact, if the whole apparatus of state
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were to vanish, it would be a good thing, right?
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- Right.
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- And the neo liberals in the wake of the collapse
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of the Habsburg Empire in the case of these thinkers
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of the Geneva school especially,
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who were concerned with the rise of nationalism,
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thinking that certain forms of virulent nationalism
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could hinder or inhibit the market forces doing their thing,
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believed that rather than just
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militate against government and institutions
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that you would concede that they're here to stay.
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And now the point, if I understand what I've read
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of your argument that the point would be to find a way
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to negotiate the demands of state with the demands
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of a free market and that you would rather than presume
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to repudiate the nation state, you would what you call
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incase, the incasement which is that you would prevent
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as much as possible interference of governments
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from the free flow of capital.
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- That's right, people like Hayek for example,
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and you see this up to the present with people like Charles Murray
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for example will often call themselves classical liberals,
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drawing a kind of self-conscious genealogy back
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to someone like Adam Smith in the 18th century.
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But the reason why I think neo-liberalism is an appropriate label
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is the changed conditions of the 20th century
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versus the 19th century.
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And the most important changed conditions
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that I focus on in the book are one, the emergence
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of universal suffrage as ever more common norm globally.
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So the idea of one man, one vote, which becomes a reality,
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certainly by the end of the second world war
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from much of the world was simply not the dominant principle
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in the 18th century.
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And secondly, the end of empire, the dissolution
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of European overseas empires into self-determining
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nation-states that began in my argument
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with the end of the first world war.
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And then progressed into the 1960s and '70s
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presents new challenges to liberalism.
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So in the 19th century you could rely on
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from the liberal point of view, the British Empire
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to oversee the stability of some kind of global monetary
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order, the stability of global financial flows,
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gunboat diplomacy ensured that if people weren't being paid
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back by this or that foreign government
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then force would be used to get those debts back.
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Egypt becomes a colony because it effectively goes
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into bankruptcy and Britain steps in and takes over.
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So there's all of these forms of unilateral force
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that become no longer viable and so naked away
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in the era of decolonization and mass democracy.
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So the question indeed becomes one of how to redesign
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or refashion the state to practice
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that sort of imperial oversight over capitalism but in a new form.
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- In fact your book is called Globalists
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and I get a sense that the main protagonists were,
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I don't wanna say that they were nostalgic for empire
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but that they would have been much more comfortable
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with empire rather than nation as a model
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because empires have a global, a more global reach.
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They would not impose the same kind of trade barriers
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at least between different ethnic groups
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within their large, vast domains and so forth.
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And yet the distinction that Carl Schmidt draws
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between Imperium and dominion, yeah, dominion.
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It's the Imperium being the power
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that you would then associate with the nation state.
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So it would be political power.
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Dominion would be the realm of capital or market.
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- Is that property?
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- Do I get that right?
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- Yeah.
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- He makes that distinction lamenting the fact
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that there's a double world,
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the world of Imperium and Dominion.
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Your guys like the idea that there's a double world
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and wanna make sure that one of them
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does not infringe on the other, correct?
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- That's right.
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I think there's two things there.
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I mean, first on the question of empires,
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from the point of view of the neoliberal,
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as I studied, there were sort of many bad empires
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and very few good ones.
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So the British Empire, they saw as a positive example
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because it did not practice protectionism
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and didn't create tariff walls within its own colony.
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So that form of empire became something
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that could be a kind of template.
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The Hopsburg Empire was famously quite protectionist.
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So what was attractive about the Hopsburg Empire
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was the way in their mind it protected
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the very division you're mentioning from Schmidt,
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which is the idea as high it called,
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called it that you could have a double government.
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So on the one hand, you could have a kind of
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an institutional arrangement whereby goods
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could flow freely, capital could flow freely.
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And wherever your property was in the world,
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it would still be your property.
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And there would be no sense that it was in jeopardy
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or was gonna be taken away by the sovereign power
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under which it happened to be located.
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So there'd be a world of dominion
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and one sphere of the double government
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and the other sphere would be the world of imperium
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and sovereign self-determination states.
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So this is this doubled world as I described,
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but it is indeed what Schmidt saw as kind of
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the nightmare world of liberalism that had been produced
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by the 19th century where politics had been drained
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to such a point that it couldn't exercise its own
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control even over things on its own territory.
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So if a foreign capitalist owned, let's say,
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the coal mines in your country
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and you needed that coal for your own nation's development,
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you would have no right or ability to simply nationalize
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or make or socialize that coal mine
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and use it for the well-being of your own people
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because the doubled world of 19th century liberalism meant
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that even though it was right in front of you,
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it was beyond your grasp because it was contained
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in this world of property rather than that
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in the world of politics.
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So the reason I mentioned that I'm intrigued
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about how the conversation is going on fold
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is because I did not get a clear sense
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from reading you whether you're championing
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these neo-liberals or whether you're just being neutral
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as a historian, but let me just tell you my impression
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from reading what I have of your book is that
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the neo-liberals Geneva School and other,
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maybe, forms of it, that there's no sense of any allegiance
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to either a people, a nation state, a polity
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that it's the complete promiscuity of capital
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and that you need dominion so that anyone
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will theoretically be able to own not only property
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but factories and interests in any country of the world
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and that there should be this complete cash blanche
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when it comes to the global circulation of capital.
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And first, I admit this was a nightmare precisely
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because it infringed on self-determination
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of nations and of peoples and so forth.
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In the research, I've done a lot of people
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are very vociferous critics of neo-liberalism,
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precisely because I think it's a completely one-sided
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in its allegiance to global capital,
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which means non-alligence to anything
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not associated with that.
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And frankly, my instincts are to say that
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that kind of dominion, I would really
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probably favor strong measures to protect
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against that kind of rampant freedom for capital
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to just to follow its bliss wherever it leads.
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- Yeah, I mean, I think that I am also critical
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of neo-liberalism as I think becomes clear,
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perhaps the further you read into the book.
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And the reason that I'm critical of it
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is because of my own kind of prior normative beliefs
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about the good life and a good order.
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And I believe I do believe in the principles of social justice
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and some form of redistributive egalitarianism
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and redistributive equality.
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And neo-liberalism as a project is expressly designed
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to undercut-- - Expressively.
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Oh, yes, definitely, definitely.
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- Definitely, definitely. - Definitely.
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The best example that Warren can use
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is the title of Hayek's book from the 1970s,
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the second book of his law legislation and liberty trilogy
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and the title is the Mirage of Social Justice,
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which he means, Social Justice doesn't actually mean anything.
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It can't be pursued because no collective can decide
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conclusively on what kind of world they all want to live in.
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The only way for any kind of justice to be enacted
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is a justice before the law.
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So everyone needs to have a right to enter the market
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and compete on their own terms.
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And inequality is a necessary outcome of that,
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not just an unfortunate outcome, but a necessary outcome.
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And the model that I'm describing
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at a kind of a global level is one that allows for
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what neo-liberalism self-s' call policy competition,
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which a lot of other people would call a battle
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to the bottom.
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I mean, this idea that if you do have completely
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a fulfilled loose capital that is a natural right,
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and in fact, as I talk about in one of the chapters,
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there was an attempt to even write in a human right
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of capital flight to amend that to the UN Declaration
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of Human Rights.
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If there's a human right of capital flight,
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that means any time a state chooses to do something
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whether it's to expand their public education system
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or to expand their health insurance program
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to raise taxation for purposes of redistribution
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or purposes of creating more quality within their own nation,
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then capital will just up and leave.
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And this is an intentional feature
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of competitive federal system of the kind
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that the neo-liberalists are describing.
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- Well, are they in describing or envisioning
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or hoping for it because it seems a reality
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that capital can just pick up and leave any time it was
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from at least developed nation states?
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- Right.
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Well, that's where one needs to be sort of specific
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about the historical moment.
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And the Bretton Woods system, which I mentioned,
00:21:06.520
breaking down in the 1970s, one of the ways that one saw
00:21:11.720
it breaking down was the capital controls
00:21:14.520
that had been in existence from 1945 until the early 1970s,
00:21:20.320
by which you couldn't simply up and take your money
00:21:23.720
out of a country at the moment you wanted to.
00:21:25.880
That was the norm at something like the IMF
00:21:27.840
that capital controls were necessary
00:21:29.680
because at that point the horizon of political hope
00:21:34.280
was to produce indeed a kind of a forest,
00:21:36.960
well-ferrous state in miniature sort of modularly repeated
00:21:41.280
in all of the new states of the decolonizing world.
00:21:44.520
So the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system was the freeing
00:21:48.560
of capital from those constraints and the ability now of ever
00:21:53.840
more globally-foot-loose capital to discipline
00:21:57.160
any attempts of creating domestic welfare states
00:22:00.000
or redistribution of states.
00:22:02.120
And that was an intentional project of which some of the people
00:22:06.640
I'm describing were sort of active participants in.
00:22:08.880
So Gottfried Haberler, who you mentioned in the outset,
00:22:12.240
was one of the chief proponents of the move
00:22:14.760
from a fixed exchange rate system
00:22:17.320
through a floating exchange rate system.
00:22:19.400
And before the 1970s, the rate at which currencies were
00:22:26.400
exchanged was not determined freely by speculative capital.
00:22:30.440
It was regulated by the IMF.
00:22:32.600
And if you wanted to change your exchange rate,
00:22:34.360
you needed to go to the IMF and consult with them, et cetera.
00:22:37.240
After the 1970s under a system of floating exchange rate,
00:22:40.480
speculative capital determined the value of currency.
00:22:43.280
So how did the floating rate system win out?
00:22:48.560
Why?
00:22:49.640
Was it the neoliberal theorists that were convincing
00:22:52.600
politicians?
00:22:53.360
I just had a better way to go, or was there
00:22:55.560
there's some way in which--
00:22:57.800
well, the fixed rate was just working
00:23:00.520
against the economic self-interest of the countries.
00:23:03.880
Well, it was in part a persuasive project
00:23:06.280
undertaken by Haberler and Fritz Mahlop,
00:23:10.320
who was another Vienna-trained economist
00:23:14.640
who I described in the book, who coordinated with central bankers
00:23:18.880
and figures from finance to push this self-consciously.
00:23:21.920
It's a program beginning in the 1960s to the mid-1960s.
00:23:24.880
But one of the problems was that the realities
00:23:29.040
that they were confronting that states were confronting
00:23:30.880
was it was ever harder to actually control people
00:23:33.680
getting around capital controls.
00:23:35.320
Among other things, you had the creation
00:23:37.400
of what was called a Euro-dollar market, meaning
00:23:41.200
that people were getting around capital controls
00:23:44.200
by simply keeping their investments offshore.
00:23:46.800
So the offshore world that we now think
00:23:49.440
of at the kind of constellation of tax havens
00:23:52.160
where capital goes to find low tax rates and kind of secrecy
00:23:56.960
was something that was already emerging in the 1960s.
00:23:59.280
So partially the move to floating exchange
00:24:01.080
rates was just simply to say-- or the disappearance
00:24:03.280
of capital controls was to concede
00:24:05.040
that this was happening in reality already.
00:24:07.800
And it was actually preventing the reinvestment
00:24:11.240
of capital at home if you simply
00:24:14.440
denied at the right to leave and then return,
00:24:17.040
which is actually very similar to the argument made
00:24:20.520
in the Trump tax reform package that just went through it,
00:24:25.240
which is just to say you can try to legislate against tax havens,
00:24:29.120
but they're just going to find new ones.
00:24:31.080
So we might as well lower tax rates at home
00:24:34.200
to try to repatriate that capital.
00:24:36.760
So it's a combination of sort of an ideological persuasive
00:24:40.280
project and the changing realities of a private financial sector
00:24:45.880
that was always looking for ways to go around regulations.
00:24:49.560
In many ways, the intellectuals and the academics
00:24:53.360
were not leading changes, but they
00:24:55.560
are simply reacting to changes that were happening
00:24:58.320
in the private sector.
00:25:00.720
So if we bring it closer to our own-- well, actually,
00:25:05.880
let's do one historical step, which
00:25:09.320
is Thatcher and Reaganism or Thatcherism and Reaganism,
00:25:13.080
because I gather that these were the two big heroes
00:25:16.600
of neoliberalism.
00:25:18.640
Or it was a peak of neoliberal influence.
00:25:23.200
And we're in a slightly different regime now,
00:25:27.160
where there's been a profound disenchantment
00:25:30.120
with globalism.
00:25:32.200
And if you look online and things like everyone
00:25:35.880
wants to repudiate the label of neoliberal,
00:25:40.080
because there's a sense among many people
00:25:43.440
that it's proven itself to be a failed philosophy
00:25:48.120
for the economy that there's more to money and capital
00:25:53.200
than just this kind of reductive value of it,
00:25:57.040
that then there's a whole debate about embeddedness
00:26:00.480
and non-embeddedness.
00:26:01.680
So was Margaret Thatcher a neoliberal classic neoliberal?
00:26:06.040
Yeah, I mean, I would classify her that way.
00:26:08.920
Therefore a globalist.
00:26:10.800
Well, see, that's where I would pause.
00:26:12.800
The reason why I was compelled to write this book
00:26:17.960
is because the intellectual histories of neoliberalism,
00:26:21.360
as they'd been written so far, were often
00:26:23.120
very much national-based histories.
00:26:25.400
So you would get a story about the influence
00:26:28.040
of the Institute of Economic Affairs
00:26:30.120
and the Adams-Smith Institute on Thatcher's rise to power.
00:26:33.880
You'd get a story about the influence
00:26:35.560
of the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise
00:26:37.840
Institute on Reagan in his time in office.
00:26:42.720
And the story about the intellectual pedigree
00:26:46.560
of international ideas of governance,
00:26:49.040
so the origins of super-national institutions,
00:26:53.400
like the World Trade Organization,
00:26:55.200
like the GATT that preceded the World Trade Organization,
00:26:58.440
was a story that hadn't really been told.
00:27:02.160
And one of the things that I think you find,
00:27:04.320
and this gets to the sort of the difficulty of selling
00:27:07.760
globalism, is it often in the writings of the people
00:27:12.440
I'm writing about is not expressly in the interest of this
00:27:15.440
or that population.
00:27:17.280
It's in the interest of some imagined totality
00:27:20.480
of the world economy, which the Theresa May quote
00:27:25.080
from earlier this year is appropriate.
00:27:27.200
If you're the citizen of the world,
00:27:28.440
you're a citizen of no place.
00:27:30.200
And there is that way in which it's politically hard
00:27:33.600
to use the notion of international citizenship
00:27:37.080
or global citizenship to make hay politically
00:27:41.000
domestically.
00:27:42.280
And the notion of diminishing sovereignty, for example,
00:27:44.960
is that not a selling strategy in any kind of series
00:27:50.360
of congressional debates about this or that policy.
00:27:53.000
But so you had something like the WTO,
00:27:55.560
you have one faction saying this reduces sovereignty
00:27:58.520
and other factions saying the United States.
00:28:00.880
This is actually increasing US sovereignty.
00:28:03.520
But the neoliberal intellectuals I'm looking at
00:28:05.880
are saying openly, yes, it is diminishing US sovereignty.
00:28:09.320
And that's a good thing that we're actually actively trying
00:28:13.000
to create a super national layer of governance
00:28:16.440
that disempowers nation states.
00:28:19.400
And the delicacy of pitching that to a domestic audience
00:28:24.280
is something that they've never quite figured out,
00:28:27.360
which is why the book ends with the World Trade Organization
00:28:30.280
protests in 1999, in which these people who had been designing
00:28:34.560
this thing for decades suddenly discovered the concept
00:28:39.480
of legitimacy and realized that they had sort of forgotten
00:28:42.320
about the need to secure legitimacy
00:28:46.920
for any large scale project of governance.
00:28:50.120
It wasn't something they had thought about.
00:28:51.440
The obsession is with a kind of a project
00:28:56.640
of legal design and institutional design,
00:29:01.040
which ironically becomes a kind of engineering project,
00:29:04.120
even though someone like Hayek was very skeptical
00:29:06.400
about the idea that human behavior could be engineered away.
00:29:09.600
There's still this idea of if we can get the constitutional
00:29:12.200
constraints right, then order will result.
00:29:16.880
But the idea of why people should be personally invested emotionally
00:29:20.600
in the world economy as a functioning order
00:29:23.920
is often a question that's not really asked.
00:29:27.480
It's-- except there is an overlapping
00:29:31.080
with certain political parties.
00:29:33.640
In the United States, one has the impression these days
00:29:37.520
that you have the Trump version of the Republican party,
00:29:44.200
which is nationalist America first.
00:29:47.600
It's anti-globalist in some ways.
00:29:51.960
I mean, at least rhetorically, of course,
00:29:53.960
in terms of the actual fiscal policies that are promoted,
00:29:57.240
just anything but--
00:29:58.920
but the Democratic party has very consistently,
00:30:04.000
at least morally, socially, environmentally speaking,
00:30:08.240
been at least perceived as through and through globalist
00:30:12.720
where America is not a nation like any other nation is where
00:30:17.680
all-- throughout diversity, it's associated
00:30:21.240
with the passage of things like Gatt and NAFTA
00:30:24.320
and the Clintonian, globalist prejudices and so forth.
00:30:30.920
And the backlash, the Nationalistic populist backlash,
00:30:36.440
it doesn't seem to have changed much the perception
00:30:40.040
of a alliance of the Democratic party with global capital.
00:30:46.200
Do you think that the Democratic party in the United States
00:30:50.600
is still a kind of bastion of this neoliberal thinking?
00:30:58.760
In other words, that if it's good for the world,
00:31:00.920
it's good for everyone?
00:31:04.000
Well, so I think that though, if there is a problem
00:31:07.040
of legitimacy for a kind of a globalist institution
00:31:09.920
building project, the problem is solved in the moments
00:31:12.920
when national interests correspond with kind of globalist
00:31:16.600
interests.
00:31:17.200
And so the mid-90s is a wonderful example of that,
00:31:20.880
where for the United States to sign on with the WTO
00:31:25.560
was not something that was really costing them anything,
00:31:28.160
because they were able to retain all of their access
00:31:31.360
to markets and retain their kind of commercial dominance
00:31:34.400
that they already had without really being
00:31:36.520
subject to any kind of downside.
00:31:39.320
That's changed in the last 25 years since the WTO was created,
00:31:44.680
as specifically the rise of China and India,
00:31:49.360
they've both been able to use the WTO in ways
00:31:52.040
that the United States had not anticipated.
00:31:54.760
So you have either a kind of departure
00:31:58.840
of the national interest from the kind of globalist project.
00:32:02.800
And I think that it's more helpful to think
00:32:05.800
about some of the ways in which institution building
00:32:09.000
kind of corresponds with also exertions of sovereign power.
00:32:12.840
So I think that actually that this dichotomy of Trumpian
00:32:16.640
national populism quote unquote,
00:32:18.520
versus democratic globalism is actually not that helpful
00:32:22.520
when you look at the way that Trump's trade policy
00:32:25.160
actually works.
00:32:25.920
I agree with that, yeah.
00:32:27.320
Which isn't to say it becomes just business as usual,
00:32:29.920
but if you look at someone like Robert Lighthizer,
00:32:32.600
who's the current US trade representative,
00:32:35.400
he is, I think of him as kind of an adversarial internationalist.
00:32:39.480
So on the one hand, he will be blocking the appointment
00:32:44.560
of new judges to the appellate court at the WTO.
00:32:47.800
But at the same time, they're suing India
00:32:51.920
through the WTO, placing cases at the WTO.
00:32:55.120
So it's not an either or, it's rather a both-and relationship
00:32:59.120
to kind of global institutions, which is to say,
00:33:02.320
when it works for us to assert sovereign power
00:33:04.880
and to be tough in a kind of a shmidian
00:33:07.040
way and assert decisions, then we will do that.
00:33:10.080
But in so far as the institutions serve our interests
00:33:12.160
that we will use them as well.
00:33:14.480
And that was really the model of Reagan,
00:33:17.280
like what we're seeing with Trump economically
00:33:20.400
is last to kind of throw back to the 1930s
00:33:23.280
and much more throw back to the mid-1980s
00:33:25.960
when the Reagan trade policy establishment
00:33:30.320
used moments of executive power to actually
00:33:32.920
bully people into more buy-in and to a globalist institutions.
00:33:36.480
I mean, that's the irony.
00:33:38.520
What do you think of the WTO and what is doing these days?
00:33:42.920
Or what should we think-- not what do you think?
00:33:44.600
What should we think by we, meaning citizens who are not
00:33:50.560
particularly well-versed in economic theory and policy,
00:33:54.800
but who feel that we just don't want to be screwed over
00:33:59.080
by the big capitalist bullies that determine our fate,
00:34:04.960
regardless of any kind of democratic consent
00:34:09.400
that is accorded.
00:34:10.800
Decisions being made independently of any political process
00:34:14.280
or accountability are environments and habitats
00:34:17.240
being transformed through just the logic of capital.
00:34:21.840
And it's the world trade organization
00:34:26.040
just enabling this kind of indiscriminate, so-called economic
00:34:30.440
development all around the world, regardless
00:34:33.120
of what Rousseau would have called the Volontization
00:34:36.520
or any kind of general will or the people's will.
00:34:40.120
Right.
00:34:41.440
I think it depends on where you stand.
00:34:43.840
I mean, at the moment of the passage of the WTO,
00:34:48.000
if you were from a small nation in the world economy,
00:34:51.560
you had two options, either be subject
00:34:53.680
to the lateral policy decisions of the United States
00:34:58.000
and they'd be treated however they chose to treat you
00:35:00.040
in any given moment, or at least have the semblance
00:35:03.000
of a forum where there was lip service being paid to something
00:35:06.640
like the rule of law and equal treatment.
00:35:08.880
And so for a lot of-- it was a lesser of two evils
00:35:11.040
for a lot of global South countries, which was to say,
00:35:14.200
we will use this as a negotiating forum
00:35:17.440
because we don't have any other option,
00:35:19.160
other than no forum at all.
00:35:21.240
I think the question is different if you're
00:35:23.040
sitting in the United States, because then you get back
00:35:25.480
the debates return to the moment of the passage of the WTO
00:35:29.000
in which you had the adversaries of the WTO
00:35:31.840
were on the two far ends of the spectrum in a way, right?
00:35:34.480
Bernie Sanders was opposed to the creation of the WTO.
00:35:38.800
But so was Papi Cannon.
00:35:41.760
So if you are going to make the gamble of returning power
00:35:46.320
to the national sovereign, then much
00:35:47.800
starts to depend on who that sovereign is, right?
00:35:50.800
And then the question of the general will kind of reasserts itself,
00:35:54.640
which is to say, if you do what some of the interesting things
00:35:58.480
that, for example, this Lighthizer is doing
00:36:00.520
in his opposition to NAFTA as it exists,
00:36:03.280
he's actually against these investor state dispute courts,
00:36:07.920
right?
00:36:08.080
These sort of private courts that can do things
00:36:10.920
to override the sovereign decisions of nations.
00:36:13.240
And for the left, that's been an argument
00:36:14.880
that they've been making for decades,
00:36:16.120
is that the bad thing about the WTO and the NAFTA
00:36:18.920
is it takes power, depoliticized, and de-democratizes economic power.
00:36:25.320
So on the face of it, that's actually something good.
00:36:28.000
But if that repoliticization is being pursued
00:36:32.560
in the interest of a political project
00:36:34.000
that we're not interested in, then politics is bad, right?
00:36:36.400
I mean, it just raises the question again of how
00:36:39.680
the political gets defined locally.
00:36:42.400
But I think it definitely one can see a way
00:36:47.440
in which American investment at a sort of popular level
00:36:52.240
and an elite level in a project of depoliticization
00:36:56.520
is a kind of waning.
00:36:58.040
I mean, the investment in the supernational
00:37:00.320
and the international, because they don't see their own
00:37:02.360
interest intersecting with a kind of global project anymore,
00:37:06.600
it means that politics will reassert itself
00:37:08.960
as more of a problem and more of a divisive problem.
00:37:12.080
But one that then it just becomes the responsibility
00:37:14.200
of everyday Americans to fill with,
00:37:17.160
the content of solidarity and a notion of Americanness built on
00:37:21.640
the demos, an inclusive notion of the demos
00:37:25.120
rather than an exclusive notion of the ethnos.
00:37:27.800
- Right, so we'll return to this in a moment,
00:37:31.880
but let's take a step back to talk a little bit about
00:37:35.680
your book, Globalist, the End of Empire
00:37:37.920
and the birth of neoliberalism
00:37:39.680
and the so-called Geneva school,
00:37:41.760
you say that they're very under-acknowledged
00:37:44.440
and if you look in the Wikipedia entries and so forth,
00:37:47.520
you'll find that they'll talk about the Austrian school
00:37:51.080
of neoliberal, the Chicago school and others,
00:37:53.440
but I didn't come across a lot about the Geneva school.
00:37:56.720
And you say that that is a gap in the historical narrative
00:38:02.800
that you wanna fill by writing this book.
00:38:05.200
So what is the Geneva school?
00:38:07.880
Why is it called the Geneva school
00:38:09.720
since so many of its members were not from Geneva?
00:38:13.280
- Well, part of the reason why it isn't have a Wikipedia entry
00:38:15.960
and so on is I kind of more or less coined the term,
00:38:18.680
and the course of the book, it had been suggested by
00:38:22.360
one of the people I write about, but more or less,
00:38:24.800
I more or less created this idea of a coherent school
00:38:28.400
of thought myself out of what I thought
00:38:30.680
were pretty, for out of, I think,
00:38:32.280
pretty compelling reasons.
00:38:33.480
The people identify as members of the Geneva school
00:38:38.600
include people who did, in fact, teach and spend
00:38:41.680
a lot of time in Geneva, so Phil Humbropke
00:38:43.960
is an example he taught there for decades.
00:38:46.440
Haberler did some very important work
00:38:48.960
for the League of Nations, Ingeniva,
00:38:52.600
people like Hayek and Robbins gave very important lectures
00:38:56.360
that became kind of canonical books
00:38:58.760
about international order Ingeniva.
00:39:02.520
- It's the Journal Ordo, which is foundational journal
00:39:07.280
for neoliberalism.
00:39:08.600
Was that a Geneva-based journal?
00:39:10.800
- No, that's a German.
00:39:12.440
- German, that's published out of Freiburg,
00:39:16.960
which was the kind, the place where Hayek went
00:39:18.760
after he was in Chicago.
00:39:20.560
- So would the Geneva school be associated
00:39:23.880
with ordo liberalism, or getting the name,
00:39:27.240
or do liberalism coming, getting a name
00:39:29.400
from this journal, or do?
00:39:31.400
- No.
00:39:32.240
- Yeah, I mean, the difference between
00:39:34.600
ordo liberalism and American style
00:39:36.960
in Chicago School, neoliberalism, in broad terms,
00:39:41.320
is ordo liberalism is very attentive to this idea
00:39:43.720
of the need to create an institutional framework
00:39:46.720
for the reproduction of market competition.
00:39:50.120
So the idea of rolling back the state,
00:39:53.120
which was a central part of the rhetoric
00:39:55.160
of someone like Thatcher, or people like Thatcher and Reagan,
00:39:58.640
isn't really part of the ordo liberal rhetoric.
00:40:01.120
The the ordo liberal rhetoric has always been upfront
00:40:03.680
that what they seek is a strong state and a free market.
00:40:06.720
And the question is not, how much state,
00:40:09.080
or how little about what kind of state.
00:40:11.240
The Geneva school, as I describe it,
00:40:12.720
because it is composed of largely German speaking thinkers,
00:40:17.160
kind of poses that same question at the global level,
00:40:19.920
which is to say, what kind of institutional framework
00:40:22.800
do we need for the reproduction of market competition
00:40:26.840
at the global or international level?
00:40:29.400
And Geneva is important because it was the site
00:40:32.080
of the most intensive discussions
00:40:35.200
that the problem of international order
00:40:36.960
from the creation of the League of Nations,
00:40:39.640
the International Labor Organization was based there.
00:40:42.520
After the war, the International Standards Organization,
00:40:45.800
the GAT was based in Geneva now.
00:40:49.400
The WTO, the UN, has a branch office there.
00:40:52.800
So the site of Geneva is interesting
00:40:55.680
because it does serve as almost like this kind of
00:40:58.760
extra national location where problems of the global
00:41:03.320
can be thought of in the abstract without being too bound up
00:41:06.960
in national concerns of this or that, I'm sure.
00:41:11.360
- Good, so that's why you speak about
00:41:13.760
or do globalism might be a better term
00:41:16.120
for the Geneva school people.
00:41:18.120
So let me ask up now about,
00:41:21.080
if not the Geneva school, at least Hayek,
00:41:23.240
as one of the major proponents and democracy,
00:41:28.240
because I got a sense reading you
00:41:32.200
that there's a deep rooted fear and paranoia
00:41:36.920
about democracy and even antagonism and hostility towards it.
00:41:40.880
And let me read a quote that I came across
00:41:44.760
in your introduction about democracy
00:41:46.920
where Hayek says, "I believe that limiting the powers
00:41:49.600
of democracy in these new parts of the world
00:41:52.600
is the only chance of preserving democracy
00:41:55.600
in those parts of the world.
00:41:56.600
If democracies do not limit their own powers,
00:41:58.920
they will be destroyed."
00:42:01.280
That is something that one can think a lot about.
00:42:05.000
It's probably a lot of evidence that if democracies
00:42:10.400
do not limit their own powers and they will indeed be destroyed
00:42:14.520
not only in third world, you know,
00:42:16.160
nation, incipient democracies but even for ourselves.
00:42:21.160
And then you refer to the authoritarian liberalism
00:42:27.800
that was coined in 1933 by Herman Heller.
00:42:32.800
Now that term is, I think, back in circulation.
00:42:35.920
Is it not in places like Hungary or Turkey
00:42:40.080
or even Putin that we were talking about authoritarian liberalism
00:42:43.640
or is it authoritarian democracy?
00:42:45.640
What is the thinking there about how much
00:42:50.320
must democracy be constrained according to these people?
00:42:55.320
- Right, I mean, it's related to what the French theorist,
00:43:00.320
Chantal move calls the Democratic paradox,
00:43:03.760
which is that we sort of naturally conjoined
00:43:08.040
or have for the last several decades
00:43:09.440
this idea of liberal democracy,
00:43:11.240
but actually those two concepts are very different
00:43:13.440
and potentially in detention with one another
00:43:16.120
in the sense that liberalism is invested
00:43:19.120
in protecting a certain set of institutions
00:43:22.280
regardless of what the people think.
00:43:24.760
And democracy, on the other hand, can have highly
00:43:27.520
illiberal outcomes and so democracy,
00:43:30.200
if understood as a majoritarian expression
00:43:32.800
of the people's will, could easily say
00:43:34.880
these liberal institutions are not what we want.
00:43:37.960
So there's a constant decision being made,
00:43:41.640
you know, whether we realize it or not,
00:43:44.400
about where the sort of stress should be placed
00:43:46.400
on the democracy or the liberalism.
00:43:48.680
And the United States is a perfect example
00:43:51.160
where of course constitutional constraints
00:43:53.280
and checks and balances are an essential part
00:43:55.840
of the way democracy functions in this country.
00:43:58.680
And if you asked someone who sees themselves
00:44:01.000
as either a Hayekian or a follower of James Buchanan
00:44:04.600
who is a closely related thinker,
00:44:06.880
they would find the kind of arguments
00:44:08.480
that Hayek is making in the quote you,
00:44:10.880
you just read there quite, but now they would say
00:44:13.880
that well, this of course,
00:44:15.080
that this is the standard way that democracies work
00:44:18.560
as they produce, or they include constraints
00:44:21.880
on the will of the majority.
00:44:23.440
- Sure, they do, but what is authoritarian liberalism?
00:44:26.520
- Well, I mean, I think that there you need to sort of
00:44:32.840
look at particular moments.
00:44:35.200
So for, I'm trying to think of a good example
00:44:39.080
that I use in the book.
00:44:41.120
- I mean, would the Hungarian or bun
00:44:43.600
would he be a authoritarian liberal?
00:44:46.880
- Or.
00:44:47.720
- Well, let's use the example of something
00:44:49.960
like the Austrian freedom party,
00:44:53.360
or the alternative for Germany,
00:44:56.000
just to sort of prevent the kind of pathologizing
00:44:58.720
of the Eastern Europe as the site of the bad European politics.
00:45:03.400
- Oh, yeah, I'm all for Eastern,
00:45:05.800
meet a little Ropez, what a fair question.
00:45:07.320
- No, no, I wasn't saying that you're doing that,
00:45:09.720
but I think that you can see the stuff actually
00:45:12.600
in the heartland of order liberalism quite clearly.
00:45:15.920
And there, if you look at the position of something
00:45:19.400
like alternative for Germany, AFD party,
00:45:23.520
their argument is that to preserve exactly conditions
00:45:28.520
of competition and free trade,
00:45:31.040
then there needs to be the ability to override things
00:45:34.840
like the freedom of entry for refugees
00:45:39.720
or non-Western immigrants.
00:45:42.200
So, and the curtailment of free speech
00:45:45.600
for certain kinds of unacceptable attacks on Western values
00:45:50.600
and things like that.
00:45:52.760
So, the notion of using the force of the state
00:45:57.320
to push back against threats to the market order,
00:46:02.320
could be seen in the example like that.
00:46:04.840
I'm just remembering now some examples from the book
00:46:07.760
in the case of the interwar period in Austria,
00:46:12.880
the use of police violence against striking protesters
00:46:16.360
or against organized labor was something that
00:46:21.000
some, that Mises saw as entirely acceptable
00:46:23.560
and actually necessary.
00:46:24.720
So, Mises helped draft something with the,
00:46:27.160
that he called the anti-terror law,
00:46:29.480
which was designed to designate any forms of strike
00:46:33.600
labor action as terror and therefore just to find
00:46:36.920
the imposition of, or the use of police violence.
00:46:41.280
So, this, I think that the use of the police wing
00:46:45.760
of the state against threats to the market order
00:46:48.520
usually originating in organized labor
00:46:51.520
is a pretty clear case of authoritarian liberalism,
00:46:55.400
as I understand it.
00:46:56.480
- And can I ask about another important figure
00:47:01.080
who's not part of the Geneva school
00:47:03.040
and in some times is argued against neoliberalism,
00:47:08.400
that's Polany, the Hungarian economist theorist,
00:47:13.400
historian historian.
00:47:16.040
He's very big these days, right?
00:47:18.000
- He is, yeah.
00:47:18.960
- And in what way does he not conjugate well
00:47:23.480
with the neoliberals you're dealing with?
00:47:27.040
- Well, it's an argument that I make in the introduction
00:47:29.120
which is that I think that it's better to think
00:47:32.520
of people like Hayek and Rupa as contemporaries of Polany,
00:47:37.040
which of course they are and of people who are arguing
00:47:41.040
for a form of embeddedness as Polany argues for it
00:47:44.520
rather than, so that capitals should not, yeah.
00:47:48.160
- Well, it depends on the fine embeddedness.
00:47:50.160
I mean, the argument that gets the sort of,
00:47:53.120
the short version of the argument about Polany's argument
00:47:56.880
that gets made is that liberals and thereby
00:48:00.240
neoliberal seek to disembed the market from society
00:48:05.360
because they believe that a market can be self-regulating
00:48:08.640
and therefore effectively institutions can fall away,
00:48:11.760
community bonds can fall away
00:48:13.280
and we will all just encounter each other
00:48:14.920
as kind of exchanging units in the marketplace.
00:48:18.880
And this leads to a vision of neoliberalism as an ideology
00:48:22.880
which I think is not very accurate
00:48:24.520
because as I'm trying to argue in the book,
00:48:27.280
they were equally interested in embeddedness
00:48:29.840
but simply for different outcomes than him
00:48:31.760
whereas he wanted to use embeddedness as a way
00:48:34.040
to increase the sense of social evenness
00:48:37.200
and equality and redistribution and local identity,
00:48:40.880
they want to use embeddedness specifically to embed
00:48:43.760
the freedom of capital to move where it wants to
00:48:46.280
and so on.
00:48:47.120
- So they could be careless about social justice
00:48:48.840
as you said earlier.
00:48:50.040
- They are explicitly opposed to social justice.
00:48:52.000
I mean, the argument against democracy,
00:48:54.600
I think it's worth dwelling on that for a moment
00:48:57.320
is a kind of a mixture of two things.
00:48:59.080
It's a way of seeing people as both naturally inclined
00:49:02.760
towards solidarity and naturally inclined towards self interest
00:49:06.160
and both of those are problems for someone like Hayek
00:49:08.560
and a democracy because either people are going to use
00:49:11.960
their vote to effectively blackmail politicians
00:49:15.080
to give them favors and leaving the state as kind of the prey
00:49:18.680
to be torn apart by the electorate and eventually
00:49:20.880
they make so many promises that the whole thing
00:49:23.400
turns into inflation and falls apart
00:49:25.840
or people are still kind of hardwired from their time
00:49:29.680
as members of the tribe on the savannah
00:49:32.240
which is really how Hayek thought about it
00:49:34.200
to want to be communally sharing all of the resources
00:49:37.520
available with the small group in the village
00:49:39.480
the way that they would have once.
00:49:41.200
I mean, this is actually Hayek's argument
00:49:43.080
that we still have this sort of remnant of our tribal life
00:49:47.240
and so we mistakenly extrapolate that to the modern
00:49:51.600
state form and think we can actually practice socialism
00:49:54.640
and communism like we used to on the savannah.
00:49:57.320
So the democratic subject is sort of
00:50:01.360
doubly hazardous for the reproduction of a market order
00:50:05.960
because of both wanting everything for themselves
00:50:08.280
and also having this idea that we can have it all.
00:50:10.320
But it's a sense that the reproduction of the market order
00:50:13.000
is ultimately good for everyone or is it completely
00:50:16.520
beyond good and evil to use an etienne term
00:50:20.640
and it's money, don't confuse money with humanity
00:50:25.240
and it's the philosophy of the country.
00:50:27.640
But we need to, if you have to choose between money
00:50:29.920
and humanity, choose money.
00:50:31.800
- Yeah, I mean, it's a good question
00:50:34.440
and I think there's a recent book about liberalism
00:50:38.440
that was published in Germany called the philosophy
00:50:40.040
of the lesser evil.
00:50:41.120
And I actually think that's quite a helpful way
00:50:42.640
of thinking about it, which is to say there is often
00:50:45.960
this argument made that this may not be a happy thought
00:50:50.560
that this might be a kind of a cold way of looking at the world.
00:50:53.680
They'll make this argument themselves.
00:50:55.760
The one of Buchanan's most famous books is called
00:50:58.440
"Politics Without Romance."
00:51:00.880
There's this argument that one needs to face
00:51:03.920
the sort of the coldness and cruelty of the world
00:51:07.040
because it's better than sort of no world at all.
00:51:10.960
So it's actually deeply pessimistic ideology
00:51:13.520
when you read the writings of the thinkers themselves,
00:51:16.440
which I think quite different from the sunny kind of 1990s
00:51:19.760
in a world of Coca-Cola kind of neoliberalism,
00:51:22.280
the way that people think about it a lot.
00:51:23.800
We're all part of a world of goods and money.
00:51:26.280
But for the new liberals that I study anyway,
00:51:29.520
they're gloomy, fantasy, act, Viennese intellectuals
00:51:32.240
at the end of it, right?
00:51:33.560
They sort of see the need for a market order as a way
00:51:36.400
to prevent kind of the mass death that would result
00:51:39.280
if we try to actually enact socialism.
00:51:41.520
- So that's what they believed in it.
00:51:44.720
- Yeah, I mean, Hayek says, if we try to genuinely carry
00:51:47.760
out socialism and create a communist society,
00:51:50.320
then billions of people who are now living will die.
00:51:53.600
And why would it not be the case if you just let capital
00:51:58.720
follow its own vagaries wherever it led?
00:52:02.320
- Without a state framework you mean?
00:52:06.160
Or even within a state framework that would enable
00:52:11.160
it to function better rather than inhibit it.
00:52:16.520
- You're saying why won't that lead to mass death?
00:52:18.640
- Yes, or mass misery or something equal to that.
00:52:23.560
- Absolutely horrible.
00:52:25.000
- I mean, it becomes this competition of kind of,
00:52:28.640
you know, this is actually where we're at often
00:52:30.840
the kind of left right conversations
00:52:32.800
at the moment as a sort of argument about body counts, right?
00:52:35.640
I mean, you know, who is creating more misery,
00:52:38.440
who has caused more deaths, you know,
00:52:39.960
was malware, sent Hitler, et cetera.
00:52:42.080
- Yeah, well, it's not only fascism versus communism,
00:52:45.440
but it's also this ravage that there's enough evidence
00:52:50.440
to suggest that the ravages of capitalism are not negligible.
00:52:54.440
As Mark said in the Communist Manifesto,
00:52:57.280
it doesn't mean you have to go all follow his whole agenda,
00:52:59.440
but he says that there's an invested interest
00:53:02.760
in capitalism to create uproot and destabilize
00:53:07.920
and create conditions of havoc so that in that turbulence,
00:53:12.920
you know, you can serve the interests of enrichment.
00:53:17.800
- Right, yeah, and that's where I think,
00:53:19.720
I mean, I spent some time in the book in the decade of the 1970s,
00:53:24.320
and this is something that wouldn't have to study
00:53:26.080
in a different book,
00:53:27.440
but the way in which the natural limits
00:53:31.560
of the worlds, the globes carrying capacity,
00:53:34.640
the earth's carrying capacity,
00:53:36.600
which were very much in the forefront of people's minds
00:53:39.840
in the 1970s.
00:53:41.000
- I think. - Serious policy makers know.
00:53:42.920
Much more than now, and that's what I was gonna say,
00:53:44.560
is that one of the real victories of neoliberalism
00:53:47.680
and it still needs to be tracked how it actually happened,
00:53:51.760
was to sort of roll back or reverse that true sense
00:53:56.000
of existential threat about the limits of the earth's
00:54:00.640
carrying capacity that I think was much more mainstream,
00:54:03.600
and you say it was a victory,
00:54:04.720
but it's a victory that was not necessarily desirable, right?
00:54:08.880
- From my point, you know, but I mean, from there,
00:54:11.080
- No, but I mean, from there, no, I mean,
00:54:12.520
I think that we would be well-served to actually,
00:54:15.520
you know, face the kind of the strong limits
00:54:19.920
to this ever proliferating world of capitalist human structure.
00:54:23.240
- It's never because environmental deregulation
00:54:25.320
would be almost like a tentative faith
00:54:26.960
for this neoliberal thinking, right?
00:54:29.560
- It is, I mean, it's the notion that there will always
00:54:32.600
be a technological fix, that there will always be some way
00:54:36.800
in which the limits of the earth's resources
00:54:39.880
will be transcended.
00:54:41.520
So the Heritage, or the American Enterprise Institute,
00:54:44.640
for example, sort of pursues this in two directions.
00:54:46.680
On the one hand, there's a lot of work sort of
00:54:49.720
questioning climate science.
00:54:51.360
There's a lot of work that comes out of neoliberal
00:54:53.320
think tanks trying to undo the evidentiary base of
00:54:58.320
climate change, but on the other hand,
00:55:02.560
there's also a unit.
00:55:04.040
Philip Marowski talks about this at the American Enterprise
00:55:06.360
Institute on geoengineering.
00:55:08.280
So there's both a kind of a belief in the mammoth
00:55:11.240
technological fix and an undermining of the notions of truth
00:55:15.800
that help try to anchor us to a realistic sense
00:55:20.320
of how much the earth can actually give us.
00:55:22.360
- Yeah, and that's, well, that's the totalizing monster
00:55:24.720
of technology is that the problems that it creates
00:55:27.480
creates them in such a way that only it can provide
00:55:30.280
the solutions to them.
00:55:31.280
So you get more of the same and you get into this
00:55:33.920
hypedigarian cycle of endless consumption and production
00:55:38.920
that each feeds the other.
00:55:40.360
- Right.
00:55:41.200
- So I began in my intro, speaking about the kind of
00:55:47.800
untimely thinking or the way in which one can
00:55:52.320
re-venture future possibilities that hide in the
00:55:55.360
shadowy recesses of the past, I mentioned.
00:55:57.760
And I said that that's not the has been passed of
00:56:00.640
historiography, but this stream of latent legacies that
00:56:05.000
might come to us from previous thinkers or
00:56:10.160
previous schools.
00:56:11.280
Is there anything in your opinion of the Geneva
00:56:14.560
school thinking that can be freely and creatively
00:56:19.400
retrieved and recast as a future possibility that, you
00:56:24.560
know, might make it worthwhile for us to take them
00:56:29.800
seriously and not just be horrified at the kind of
00:56:32.920
indifference to certain forms of human disaggregation
00:56:37.600
that might be implied there.
00:56:39.760
- Well, I think that if one thinks about the book itself that
00:56:43.640
I've just written, that could be discovered probably
00:56:47.320
more profitably in the opponents of the Geneva
00:56:50.200
school neoliberal that I follow throughout, because
00:56:52.680
what the book is, the book is not just a kind of a
00:56:54.920
doctrinal reading of the master tax to produce the kind
00:56:59.200
of authoritative version of the ideology of
00:57:02.400
neoliberalism on its own terms.
00:57:03.640
But it's arguing that neoliberalism as a way of
00:57:06.680
thinking was worked out in opposition over the decades with
00:57:10.760
threats to or what they perceived as threats to the
00:57:13.760
market order.
00:57:14.760
And these threats were competing forms of globalism, in
00:57:18.120
fact, and competing ideas of justice that would be, I
00:57:22.800
think, a better reservoir for kind of unrealized futures
00:57:26.400
than trying to kind of retrofit some part of the
00:57:28.760
Geneva school neoliberal thought in itself.
00:57:31.600
So, and I think that is a difference from, you know,
00:57:34.120
talking about the Earth consciousness of the 1970s, but the
00:57:38.120
global South consciousness of even the 1990s, when people
00:57:41.080
were talking about the WTO and its effect on parts of the
00:57:46.000
third world, for example, I don't feel like our current
00:57:49.400
discussion about international political economy and
00:57:53.480
globalism versus nationalism really has as much time anymore
00:57:57.240
for the thought of the global repercussions and the way
00:58:02.400
that this reaches into the lives of people who aren't, don't
00:58:04.560
share our same background or our same nationality, because
00:58:07.880
it's become pitched as this question of can we retrieve
00:58:11.200
populism for the left or a nationalism be a positive
00:58:14.680
force for the left, that kind of cosmopolitan impulses of
00:58:17.800
caring about distant humans as much as we care about
00:58:20.800
ourselves seems to have been relegated to a kind of a
00:58:24.080
secondary status.
00:58:25.080
So I think paying attention again to, you know, the lives of
00:58:28.760
people who compose the vast majority of the world's
00:58:31.600
population might be a good move here too.
00:58:34.760
Yeah.
00:58:35.960
So and that means that there may be a school that is not the
00:58:41.600
direct air of this Geneva school in particular, right?
00:58:45.440
Well, thank you very much.
00:58:47.360
We've been speaking with Professor Quinn Slobodian,
00:58:50.400
Professor of History at Wellesley about his new book that
00:58:53.840
just came out with Harvard University press called Globalist,
00:58:56.560
the End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism.
00:58:59.600
I'm Robert Harrison for entitled opinions.
00:59:01.560
Thanks for listening.
00:59:02.360
And thank you again, Quinn, for coming on to entitled
00:59:04.640
opinions.
00:59:05.240
Thank you for having me.
00:59:06.120
Take care.
00:59:06.600
[MUSIC]
00:59:16.600
[MUSIC]
00:59:26.600
Since I've been, when I saw my name, I thought I'd seen the last
00:59:37.440
That old frame
00:59:38.880
Don't want my heart to be broken and teased
00:59:46.860
And you can chew many chances
00:59:51.700
Sometimes it's been when the dream he has
01:00:04.920
I must be in some kind of poor paradise
01:00:10.320
I don't know what to take, but yeah, I can't hurt
01:00:18.120
You can chew many chances
01:00:22.320
No matter what I'm doing it is wrong
01:00:30.920
But I can't hear myself
01:00:34.720
I can't see you
01:00:36.720
No matter what I'm doing it is wrong
01:00:39.720
I cannot understand it
01:00:41.720
I can't hear myself
01:00:44.720
I know what I'm doing it is wrong
01:00:47.720
But I can't hear myself
01:00:50.720
See you
01:00:52.720
Sometimes what I'm doing is wrong
01:00:55.720
And I'll get burned
01:00:58.720
(Music)
01:01:18.720
I'm always on my guard
01:01:21.720
I gotta cover my dream
01:01:26.720
It's been so hard to keep behind the line
01:01:31.720
Still searching for treasure
01:01:37.720
Looking for pleasure
01:01:40.720
I'm taking true many chances
01:01:44.720
Yes, I am
01:01:46.720
I know what I'm doing it is wrong
01:01:52.720
But I can't hear myself
01:01:55.720
I can't hear myself
01:01:57.720
I know what I'm doing is wrong
01:02:00.720
I can't understand it
01:02:03.720
I can't hear myself
01:02:05.720
I know what I'm doing is wrong
01:02:08.720
But I can't hear myself
01:02:11.720
See you
01:02:13.720
Sometimes what I'm doing is wrong
01:02:16.720
But I'll get burned
01:02:19.720
Yeah, I can't hear myself
01:02:23.720
I know what I'm doing is wrong
01:02:28.720
But I can't hear myself
01:02:31.720
See you
01:02:34.720
Sometimes what I'm doing is wrong
01:02:37.720
I can't understand it
01:02:39.720
I can't understand it
01:02:41.720
I know what I'm doing is wrong
01:02:45.720
But I can't hear myself
01:02:48.720
I know what I'm doing is wrong
01:02:52.720
I can't hear myself
01:02:55.720
I know what I'm doing is wrong
01:02:57.720
But I can't hear myself
01:03:00.720
I know what I'm doing is wrong
01:03:03.720
But I can't hear myself
01:03:07.720
See you
01:03:10.720
Sometimes what I'm doing is wrong
01:03:11.720
I can't understand it
01:03:14.720
I know what I'm doing is wrong
01:03:17.720
I know what I'm doing is wrong
01:03:21.720
[BLANK_AUDIO]