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06/15/2018

Alison McQueen on Political Realism and Apocalypse

Alison McQueen is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University.  Her research focuses on early modern political theory and the history of International Relations thought.  Alison’s recently published book Political Realism in Apocalyptic Times, traces the responses of three canonical political realists—Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and Hans Morgenthau—to hopes and fears about the end […]

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[Music]
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This is KCSU Stanford. Welcome to entitled opinions. My name is Robert Harrison and we're coming to you from the Stanford campus.
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A lot of you queried us about the music that opened last week's show with Fred Turner,
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Is that singer the genetic replica of Robert Plant or what?
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So thank you all for joining in the ongoing conversation of entitled opinions
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express our collective gratitude to Vittoria Moltenlow, the managing producer of this show,
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underworld of studio B at KZSU, where we practice the persecuted religion of thinking.
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Before I welcome today's guests and introduce her to you, let me mention that most of the shows we
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we've aired this season have had a distinctly political orientation, and I know that some of you are
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wondering whether entitled opinions has shifted its center of gravity away from the literary and
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philosophical to the political. The answer is no. In title opinions will never become a political
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talk show because we have other more important things to think about here, like the history of
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the aphorism or inflationary cosmology or Edgar Allan Poe's legacy and French modernism
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or the vagaries of the so-called singularity. Yet it's also the case that politics is a reality
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that is hard to ignore these days. I call it a reality but I would do better to call it a
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sur reality. Every day when I open the newspaper or watch the news, I have the same sense of
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disorientation, a feeling that America has jumped into an alternate reality, like one of those
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Star Trek episodes where the enterprise phases into a different timeline. Things seem real
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enough but something is not quite right, since this reality is not the one it belongs to,
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not the one it's supposed to be in. I keep feeling we need to get back to the timeline in which
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Hillary Clinton won the election and Donald Trump still lives in Trump Tower and not in the White House.
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Clearly this is one of those moments when the surreal has erupted into the real
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and it takes an extra effort on our part to preserve our lucidity and sanity. So maybe
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in title opinions has merely been trying to do its share when it comes to maintaining
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this grip on the real this season. Is there such a thing though as the real when it comes to politics?
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Or is politics an endless power struggle to define reality and impose a set of norms on it?
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Is that what power is ultimately the power to dictate what counts as real and what doesn't?
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It seems to me that the reality of politics is always fantastic to one degree or another.
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In the sense that politics always has to reckon with the crazy fears and hopes and hallucinations
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of the human imagination. American political reality in particular is caught up in the truly
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weird fantasies, paranoia, and apocalyptic passions of the American psyche.
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It's nothing short of miraculous that we have a relatively sane form of government
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when you consider what large segments of the American electorate desire, believe in,
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and think they're voting for when they cast their ballots.
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We live in a madhouse friends and I marvel that we still have something we can call a shared
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reality for how much longer no one can say.
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Speaking of politics and reality, I'm joined in the studio today by my Stanford colleague,
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Allison McQueen, an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science here at Stanford,
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who has just published a book with Cambridge University Press called "Political Realism in
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Apocalyptic Times," which probes the relation between political realism and apocalyptic system.
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Realism and apocalypse seem to belong to wholly different spheres and in some sense they do.
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Yet Professor McQueen's book explores how three political realists in particular,
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Machiavelli in the 16th century, Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century, and Hans Morgenthau in the 20th century,
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have systematically engaged and responded to the apocalyptic imaginary of their respective eras.
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Professor McQueen joins us today to share some of her thoughts about this volatile dynamic between
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realism and the apocalypse, and its strange relevance for the politics of our own time.
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Allison, welcome to the program. Thanks Robert, it's great to be here.
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Well, why don't we start since you begin your book, your first chapter is on the, you know,
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kind of history of the apocalypse and the Judeo-Christian tradition. Why don't we start then with
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this basic concepts and definitions beginning with apocalypse? What do we mean by
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apocalypse and apocalyptic thinking in general? Well, in the simplest sense,
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and apocalypse is, as the REM song tells us, the end of the world as we know it.
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Now this end could be good for us as it's described in the book of Revelation.
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It could be an end of the world where, as Revelation puts it, God will wipe every tear from
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our eyes. Death will be no more mourning and crying and pain will be no more. But,
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and apocalypse could also be bad for us. Total annihilation. Think of the end of Dr. Strange Love.
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Now, when people think apocalyptically, they're thinking about the end of the world,
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in some sense or another. They're often thinking of that end as imminent. Think about what
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the Gospels tell us that Jesus told his followers. He said, "You will see the end of the world
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in your lifetime." So there's a sense of imminence about it. There's a sense that the end is going to be
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cataclysmic. The world will end in a bang, not a whimper. In Revelation, of course, the world is
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consumed by divine violence that wipes out most of humanity. It's true as well as you write in that
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first chapter that the apocalyptic tradition in Judaism did not come merely from religious sentiment
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or some kind of fantasmatic unconscious desires, but there were a set of determinant political
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circumstances and conditions that nourished an apocalyptic mood and expectation.
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And I think that from the start, therefore, you're linking
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apocalypts with political reality. Correct?
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That's exactly right. And so if you think of the circumstances in which the
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the Jews were living, an ancient Palestine, they were living in circumstances where they'd been
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plagued by centuries of conflict, by foreign domination, by pressures for assimilation to become Hellenized
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Jews. And they asked themselves the reasonable question, "Why is all of this stuff happening to us?
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Why is all this political trauma befallen us?" Now, the first answer they came to, and one that
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we're very familiar with, is the answer of prophecy. You're suffering because you've fallen away
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from the laws of God. Get yourself into line, follow the laws of God, and everything will go better
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for you. But that answer didn't work for them. There was the phenomenon of Jewish martyrdom to
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wrestle with. The very people targeted by the rulers of ancient Palestine were often the ones who
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held fast to God's law, who were the most pious and the most religious. So how could it be
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that this kind of oppression and trauma was happening to them? And the apocalyptic worldview emerges
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as a sort of answer to that question. It's a sort of political theodicy. It's a way to understand
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oppression, dispersion, loss of sovereignty by situating it within a sacred narrative, by reassuring
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people, God is still in control, and all of your suffering is but a prelude to a better world on earth.
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Now, obviously there are many cultures in history that have undergone oppression,
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conquest, enslavement, and that have not come up with apocalyptic narratives for themselves. But
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clearly there's something about the Hebrew God, which is almost intrinsically political,
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in the sense that it was understood that there was a covenant between God and his people.
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That he would protect them as long as they are obeying the law or being obedient children.
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And therefore there was this kind of shock of how this God, with whom there was a political covenant
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that people of Israel could allow such disasters to befall his people. And as you are suggesting
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once the realities of political disasters have befell, it had to be projected into a future where
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this justice that had failed in history was going to triumph at the end of time.
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That's right. And where the suffering that the Israelites had endured would be redeemed and would be
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made meaningful, would not be the result of circumstance or unpredictable fate. It would be revealed
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to be part of God's plan and it would be redeemed at the end of days.
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And in that respect there is a strange psychological region in which apocalypse works,
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it's kind of magic on the psyche, I believe, in the Judeo-Christian tradition for sure,
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because Christianity then, as you mentioned, Jesus really believed in the imminent end of the
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world, the coming of the kingdom of God. And the Christian tradition subsequently incorporated a
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certain expectation for the end days. Maybe we don't know when it's coming, but it's coming somehow
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in the notion of history. Is that there will be some final redemption at the end of time.
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And you mentioned in your opening remarks that on the one hand there is a fear and horror
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of the end of the whole story. But there is also this strange desire. There's a, I believe,
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that there's an apocalyptic unconscious where there's some eager anticipation for some kind of end
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to finally manifest itself.
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I think that's right. I mean, the way I'd put it is, I think the biggest appeal of apocalyptic thinking
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has to do with intelligibility. We want to understand the suffering or the crises that plague our world.
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And what apocalyptic thinking does is it helps us to situate those crises in a plot, in a story that
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makes sense of them. So for the early Christians who heard the biblical revelation, the trauma of
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Roman imperial rule suddenly became meaningful for them. Their trials, their oppression, were just a
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prelude to their lives in heaven. And you can think of it in a secular sense today too. A lot
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of us long for that kind of intelligibility. People feel like things are getting worse. And apocalyptic
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stories confirm that feeling. They help us make sense of it. And if that apocalyptic thinking
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incorporates an element of redemption, it can be quite comforting. It tells us these terrible things
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that are happening to you are not random or meaningless. They're somehow a prelude to a new
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and better world. Now, that's immensely appealing. We might also say there's something that,
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in a some sense, appeals to the vanity of every generation as well. We like to think we're living
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in a special time at the edge of a great transformation. And to see ourselves as participants in the
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great denouement of history. That's immensely appealing to us as well. Yeah, you give an interpretation
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of it, which is more, let's say, sane than sometimes my suspicions around in the sense that there's
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something comforting about the idea of a redemptive end and something that provides an
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implotment of our lives and our moment in history with intelligibility and meaning.
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I think there's also some more sinister death drive or death wish and some active
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embrace of the possibility of a total annihilation. I remember in when I was a graduate student
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Cornell in the 80s, Richard Klein was a professor in romance studies. And this was during the Reagan era
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when the tension between the Soviet Union and America was very strong. And the idea, the prospect of a
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nuclear confrontation was not at all unrealistic in the minds of many people, even political experts.
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And there were a number of studies that Richard Klein was drawing attention to of how, for example,
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the exodus from metropolitan centers to the suburbs over the past several decades in America and
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other such evidence that there wasn't what he called the nuclear unconscious in America where
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our national unconscious had already decided that there was going to be a nuclear apocalypse and that
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we're at least for the cities and that we were ready to sacrifice our cities and hence the movement to
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the suburbs. So he Richard Klein started a, it's not a school, but he started an organization called
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the nuclear unconscious, which lasted for about three or four years. I thought it was very interesting,
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the kind of contributions that were made to that from people from all sorts of different
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disciplines, all predicated on the notion that we are capable as human beings to desire
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our own annihilation and not only our own redemption. I think that that's probably borne out in any
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survey of American summer blockbuster movies as well. And some sense they feed that desire in a
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safer way perhaps, but they still reflect something of it, I think. And I was reading your
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opinion piece that you have in the opinionator of the New York Times. Yes. And this was about
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Morgan Thauv, whom we're going to talk about. That's right. And how in the 60s I believe he
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he thought that Americans were way to complacent about the possibility of nuclear confrontation with
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the Soviet Union and he was trying to get the public to awaken to what the reality of a nuclear
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catastrophe would amount to and it would be the abolition of any possibility of meaning.
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Because it would be the destruction not only of individuals, but the world and histories that
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would carry on any memory of them and so on and so forth. And that in that piece you cite a survey
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that was done, that he's responding to in part, which is where people were actually quite
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sanguine about the fact that even in the worst case scenario of nuclear war with the Soviet Union,
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there would be arising from the ashes and that people would get out of their bunkers and start
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anew and perhaps it would be this clearing away. In other words, it is very hard for a public to
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believe that this kind of ultimate scenario of devastation will be there will be an end for them.
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That's right. And I think we tend to as we look back as you just did on the on the period of the
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Cold War and the apocalyptic fear in that period. We tend to forget how much optimism was in the air.
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I mean in the early 1960s, the height of the fallout shelter movement, time and life magazine
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are running features about how people might emerge after an all-out nuclear war from their
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fallout shelter. A time magazine article from the early 60s described this emergence and I
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referenced this in the New York Times piece with trousers tucked into sock tops and sleeves tied
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around wrists with hats mufflers, gloves and boots, the shelter dweller could venture forth to
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start ensuring his today and building for his tomorrow. That's what Morgenthau was trying to
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combat with his utterly bleak picture of nuclear annihilation. Yes, and do you think that he,
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Well, maybe we'll go in order of the thinkers and return to Morgenthau later on our show.
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Let's reconstruct things historically. With the Christian era, apocalypse becomes something that's
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more and more deferred. This great Fusiyan wrote this book called "Long Me, the Year 1000"
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There was all this apocalyptic kind of expectation. Yeah, hysteria. There was certain that the
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year 1000 was going to be the end of the world. It kind of passed very quietly, nothing happened.
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So this idea that the apocalypse always has to be deferred is fine. But periodically,
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these apocalyptic conditions happen in agriculture. The first thinker you deal with
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Machiavelli, who is really one of the founders of this traditional political realism, was dealing
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with a phenomenon in Florence of this guy, Savonadola, who was a fiery preacher and had some
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rather apocalyptic prophecies. Machiavelli, it's too easy to imagine that he just dismissed this
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as a bunch of nonsense, that the people were being fed, that he actually continued to engage with
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this apocalyptic thinking that was coming from Savonadola's camp. That's right. We tend to think of Machiavelli's
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perspective on Savonadola as an entirely negative one. Savonadola appears in the prints as the
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paradigmatic unarmed prophet, Chapter 6. I think there's something actually a lot more complicated
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than that going on. Savonadola preaches at the end of the 15th century in Florence. He preaches to an
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Italy torn apart by wars to a Florence in the midst of immense domestic political crisis. And his genius
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was in the way he used apocalyptic rhetoric to make sense of these crises for his audience.
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He warned them. He said, behold, the sword of the Lord falling on the earth quickly and swiftly.
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But as bad as it was, as bad as what Florence was facing was, this scourge from God would be the
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beginning of a process of worldly peace and renewal. Florence would become a new Jerusalem.
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And Machiavelli is absolutely fascinated by Savonadola. I mean, as a civil servant, Machiavelli
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is sent to go listen to and report on his sermons. He has a lot of respect for the friars,
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rhetorical skill. And I think Machiavelli himself is drawn in as a flirtation with this apocalyptic
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way of thinking. And I think where that's clearest is in the final chapter of the Prince, the chapter
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that a lot of us have trouble making sense of. It seems to come out of nowhere. The rest of the
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book is about attending to the harsh material power realities of politics. The final chapter is
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a call for redemption. And Machiavelli, like any good apocoliptist, describes a present crisis.
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He says, Italy is more enslaved than the heat bruise, more serviled than the Persians, more dispersed
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than the Athenians without a head, without order beaten, disboiled, torn, pillaged, and having
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endured ruin of every sort. But for Machiavelli as for Savonadola and as for any great apocoliptist,
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this crisis is just the prelude to an impending redemption that Italy awaits her redeemer,
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someone who will save her from her sufferings and usher in a new world. That is Savonadolan rhetoric
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at its height in Machiavelli's Prince. No doubt. It's also the chapter that is crucial to many
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interpretations of the Prince as not being this just bare bones political realist track, but that
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there's some higher good to which all this realism is being attached, namely the redemption and
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unification of Italy and doing something for the common good. And also there's other apocoliptic
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prophecies of that sort, in particular in Dante, when you have in the very first
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canto of the divine comedy where Virgil comes to rescue Dante in the dark wood and points to the
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she-wolf of greed, avarice, as the radix malorum, the root of all evil, and says there will come
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the Hound, the Velthro will come with secular redeemer and will chase that she-wolf out of Italy and
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Italy will finally be redeemed in a secular way. So there, Machiavelli is also plugging in
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to Dante's, it's not an apocoliptic scenario, but it is about redemption in this.
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It is about a crisis leading up to a moment of transformation and redemption. That's right.
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So let's talk a minute about Machiavelli's realism because I've done a show on Machiavelli before,
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and my reading of the prints is that for all the political realism of that treatise,
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there is something ironic about the fact that Machiavelli did not have much impact on political
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reality. He never founded a school, he never was responsible for creating a constitution or any
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institution. He hasn't been nearly as impactful on reality as something like Marxism or Jean-Jacques
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Rousseau, the dreamer, or even Christianity. I mean Christianity with this other world, the orientation
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completely radically transformed the politics of Europe on the basis of its utopian projection.
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And you have natural law theorists, most of our listeners have never heard of, like Grotesius
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and Pufendorf and so forth. These people were much more impactful. So for someone who was so
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fixated on efficacy in the political sphere, Machiavelli's, the prints has been strangely
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feckless. I mean, the most you can say about it is that Kissinger preferred it as bedtime reading,
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or that Nixon really liked to read it. But isn't there a paradox that somehow historically
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speaking it's the great idealist of the tradition that have had more direct influence on political
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reality than the political realist like Machiavelli? That's right. This is, and this is,
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as you note, it's not particular to Machiavelli. There are some scholars of realism that suggest
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that realism, like the owl of Minerva, takes flight at dusk. We only attune ourselves to it or see
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its wisdom after all the damage of idealism has been done. And so this is a fate that
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befalls many a realist. I mean, realists ask us to attend closely to the brutalities of politics.
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They ask us to be anti-utopian and are thinking. They ask us to prioritize order and stability
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over the demands of justice. Now, these things may all be eminently sensible,
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but they're not the kinds of injunctions that move people to great sacrifices and transformations,
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even though they may be wise and often right. Yeah, I agree with that 100%. They don't have the
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power of inspiration. And yet, I'm coming more and more to believe that they have, they're right
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in many ways. And yet, unfortunately, it's the Sabonarola's who can really whip up the passions of
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people and bring about the kind of revolutions that Michael E. Lee was hoping would come about.
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Another great realist of the 20th century E.H. Carr, the British historian, said that this is a
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fate that befalls many a realist. And there's a reason why Machiavelli's prince ends in this
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redemptive chapter. There's a reason why Marx, after the most brutal analysis of the workings
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of capitalism comes to this idealistic vision of the communist revolution and its aftermath. And Carr suggested
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this is something endemic to realism and it's precisely because realism is such a bleak
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vision. It offers us no comforts, no consolation for our ills that realists in the end,
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it's such a hard position to hold that they often end with an idealistic or apocalyptic
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outburst. So what do you make of the fact that in Shakespeare, for example, the villains are
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very often the political realists? Edmund in King Lear is a kind of orthodox Machiavelli and he
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believes that power is there to be manipulate. If you need to be fraudulent, you'd be
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fraudulent. You always are temporizing. You're looking for that opportunity, the right moment in
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which to act and he has a very disabused concept of what politics is all about. And I think if
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Machiavelli had been able to read King Lear, he would have approved a Edmund all the way. And yet
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Shakespeare, who was a reader of Machiavelli himself, or at least a popular version of Machiavelli,
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invariably has his Machiavelli or Machiavellas and in a kind of abortion of their schemes to
00:29:34.480
amass the kind of power that the so-called illegitimate prince or the prince to be the would-be
00:29:43.680
prince who is not privileged through birth that Machiavelli gives all this advice to. So yeah,
00:29:50.400
I take your point. Well, I'd also like to save Machiavelli from being read as a completely
00:29:56.880
amoral thinker. I mean, I think all of his realist advice is ultimately in the service of some kind
00:30:04.560
of moral end. He comes again and again to what a prince has to do to maintain the state,
00:30:09.120
Montanare Lestato. And it's important that Machiavelli argues when he offers his most famous
00:30:16.800
realist advice when he says things like rulers must not depart from good when possible,
00:30:22.240
but know how to enter into evil when necessary. He's not giving them free reign. He's actually
00:30:28.240
relying on their judgment about what is necessary to maintain the state. And their actions are
00:30:35.280
to be put in the service of that moral end. Maintenance is, you know, there's nothing more
00:30:41.120
important than maintenance and there's nothing harder to sell than maintenance. When Hillary Clinton
00:30:45.040
says, "elect me, I will maintain continuity. I will preserve what you've had in the last eight years."
00:30:52.720
It's a hard sell. Shall we move on to Thomas Hobbes? Sure. Who is another of your protagonists.
00:31:00.880
In what way would you define him according to the four criteria that you just laid out of what
00:31:06.800
real is a political realist is? In what ways Thomas Hobbes, a quintessential political realist?
00:31:13.280
Well, I think Hobbes, like Machiavelli, thinks that politics is distinctive. It's going to have
00:31:20.400
its own kind of moral rules, its own distinct normative order. Hobbes also sees politics
00:31:28.240
as that root conflictual or agonistic. And part of the job of the sovereign or the state is to make
00:31:34.400
sure that that conflict is contained doesn't become explosive, doesn't lead to civil war.
00:31:40.480
Most importantly, Hobbes is going to insist again on the priority of order and stability
00:31:47.120
over the demands of justice. Hobbes lived through, I'll be at a distance from France, a civil war
00:31:53.760
in his own country in England. And he recognizes that order and stability are fragile
00:31:59.360
accomplishments and that justice purchased at the cost of order is going to be worthless.
00:32:06.240
And Hobbes also at times, especially as a count of human psychology, as a distinctly anti-utopian
00:32:12.240
bent, he doesn't expect much of us. And those are his starting points, and I think they're
00:32:21.200
eminently realist starting points. So he believed like a good political realist in the
00:32:29.360
distinction of some politics that it has a separate set of rules for itself. It's not ethics. I mean,
00:32:36.080
it's not completely divorced from ethics, but it's not impunable under the category of ethics
00:32:42.640
as it was for Aristotle. That's right. He believed that politics essentially conflict
00:32:48.640
sees that everywhere. So parentheses question. Trump goes to the G7 meeting,
00:32:56.240
and then insults the premier, Trudeau of Canada, and gives a sense that what kind of friends
00:33:06.160
will it's not pretend to be friends? We are actually, you know, we're competitors. It's a winner
00:33:11.280
take all thing. And he completely throws up the whole ritual and tradition of considering
00:33:19.440
ones allies, the friends and partners and collaborators and so forth. In what sense could you say that
00:33:26.160
a gesture like that is political realism on the part of Trump when he takes our best friend in
00:33:32.480
LA, Canada, and treats it like a competitor? Well, I tend to think that for the most part,
00:33:39.760
Trump would do well to read some of the some of the great realists. So I don't think it's
00:33:47.840
very realistic. And I think he also, he made a moral appeal as well, apart from throwing
00:33:55.760
Canada and Trudeau under the bus. He also said how dare Trudeau come out and when I'm on my way to this
00:34:04.240
summit in North Korea and say that Canada is going to stand firm against the United States.
00:34:09.680
This is the time when all my allies should be behind me. For God's sake, I'm about to try and
00:34:15.600
negotiate a pact with a dangerous nuclear power. And so just as he was throwing in his ally under
00:34:22.640
the bus, he was also appealing to a certain idea of what it means to be an ally, to be loyal,
00:34:28.720
and so I think there's some tension there that is not unusual with Trump. For sure. And I think
00:34:34.400
he would also benefit by understanding how fragile is the order as well as stability of international
00:34:42.720
institutions. That's right. That they are vulnerable to the unthought-through whims of the leader of
00:34:51.440
the most powerful country in the world. Right. And it's precisely because politics is all about conflict
00:34:58.240
that sometimes stability and order are that which prevents us from falling into the open armed
00:35:04.240
conflict now. That's right. And as my colleague in political science, Barry Wineghast insists one
00:35:10.880
of the great achievements of modern liberal democracies has been through institutions and laws to
00:35:19.840
lower the stakes of politics. So that conflict that Hobbes is so worried about doesn't have to
00:35:25.600
erupt into civil war and revolution. That's why we ought to value the institutions that we have
00:35:31.120
in place in the United States. So with Hobbes, the last two books of the Leviathan, you as you point
00:35:37.200
out there very much about the apocalypse or they're related to it, no? So could you say a few more
00:35:44.000
words about Hobbes and Apocalypse? Sure. So it may seem strange to suggest that Hobbes is really
00:35:50.800
preoccupied with the apocalypse because if you've read Hobbes and any of your college history
00:35:56.560
of political thought classes, you probably read the first half of Leviathan books one and two
00:36:00.880
which are very secular, very philosophical in their orientation, make a case for why it is that
00:36:07.280
rational people would want to leave the state of nature and put themselves under a virtually
00:36:11.520
absolute sovereign. But the second half of Leviathan is primarily concerned with religion and scripture
00:36:21.600
and part of that set of concerns has to do with apocalyptic expectations. Now Hobbes tells us in his
00:36:29.600
autobiography that he wrote Leviathan to absolve God's laws of the charge that they
00:36:37.200
legitimate rebellion. And I think that's how we ought to read the second half of Leviathan,
00:36:42.800
perhaps even the first half with that motivation in mind. And so Hobbes is very concerned about
00:36:50.400
the way in which apocalyptic prophecy is fueling the Civil War. The clergyman Stephen Marshall
00:36:57.920
was invited to Parliament to give a speech to the members of Parliament. And Marshall said to them
00:37:05.520
that if it be in the service of God against Antichrist that they ought to be willing to take babies
00:37:13.200
by the heels and beat out their brains against the walls, that speech was made before Parliament
00:37:19.440
and it was published by Parliament. Hobbes is concerned about that sort of rhetoric. He's concerned
00:37:26.240
about the way in which apocalyptic rhetoric vastly raises the stakes of politics, that if you see
00:37:32.800
your enemy as part of the force of Antichrist to be vanquished, then anything goes.
00:37:41.280
Beating babies against walls is okay in a battle against the Antichrist. And Hobbes realizes that
00:37:47.600
he has to disarm this apocalyptic rhetoric. And that's what he spends a lot of the second half
00:37:54.000
of Leviathan doing. So he's an opponent of apocalyptic thinking, but at the same time you say
00:38:01.520
he's fascinated by it. He's fascinated by it and he's willing to use it for his own end. So he
00:38:07.520
doesn't turn away from it. He doesn't just say this is all nonsense. He affirms parts of the
00:38:12.880
apocalyptic story, but he does what many Christian thinkers before him had done. And you just
00:38:19.440
ured to this earlier. One of the things he does is he suggests that, well, the apocalypse will
00:38:26.160
happen at some point, but it's not for us to know when it's going to happen. It's for God and it
00:38:31.920
it'll come as a thief in the night. And you should really never understand it to be happening
00:38:38.240
here and now. He also takes aim at some of the particular beliefs circulating in his time.
00:38:44.880
And so it was a commonplace of English Protestant apocalypticism to argue that the Pope was the Antichrist.
00:38:51.760
Now, this was all well and good under Elizabeth I. It helped unify England against its Catholic
00:38:57.600
enemies. The problem comes in the 17th century when suddenly people are worried that the
00:39:04.320
Church of England is looking awfully popish, that their King has Catholics sympathies. Suddenly,
00:39:10.880
the Antichrist was no longer safely over there in Rome. He was at home in England, and a lot of
00:39:17.840
English Protestants thought that they had a religious duty to combat him. And so Hobbes spends quite a bit
00:39:24.880
of one of the most lengthy chapters in the second half of Leviathan arguing that the Pope cannot
00:39:31.040
possibly be the Antichrist. Now, that looks awfully strange to us now, but if you see it in the
00:39:36.080
context of the beliefs circulating in his time, it's really clear what he's trying to do is
00:39:41.040
try to disarm what he sees as an immensely dangerous and pathological apocalypticism.
00:39:47.920
Do you believe Hobbes was a believing Christian?
00:39:51.920
I think that question is really hard to answer. It's something that scholars spend a lot of time
00:39:58.400
fighting about, and I worry that that fight actually distracts us from more important questions.
00:40:06.880
I think it's very hard to infer based on what someone in the 17th century writes on the page,
00:40:14.400
what they would have believed in the depths of their soul. That said...
00:40:18.400
Well, I guess I'm less interested in what they believed in the depths of their soul, and more what
00:40:22.880
role God plays in the political theory that you have in Leviathan.
00:40:27.680
I think that Hobbes thinks that the people around him, or at least most of those people,
00:40:36.320
are motivated by a belief in God and certain Christian commitments that go along with it.
00:40:41.760
And I think he's pragmatic enough, whatever his own beliefs are, to realize that he has to
00:40:47.120
meet them where they stand and argue on their own terms. And that is why the entire second half
00:40:52.320
of Leviathan makes its arguments with scriptural evidence. Whatever Hobbes himself believed,
00:40:59.280
he knew he had to appeal to people where they stood, where they were coming from, and that's how he did it.
00:41:04.320
Did he find this animus, this kind of hysterical animus against Catholicism to be pathological,
00:41:13.280
or in any way justified? Because it's something that it's hard to understand that chapter of British
00:41:21.040
history, if one doesn't appreciate the truly psychologically pathological animus, that many of
00:41:29.440
the actors, political actors of the time had, and paranoia about the Catholics.
00:41:37.040
Hobbes shared some views with some of these paranoid reactions to Catholicism, and the main one
00:41:45.200
he shared was a suspicion of church hierarchy, of the episcopacy. And he was worried that too much of
00:41:55.920
Catholic doctrine, legitimate religious interference and temporal jurisdiction. Those are the kinds
00:42:03.760
of things that concerned Hobbes, but that's not hysteria, that's Hobbes making reasoned arguments
00:42:09.520
about certain forms of church government. So he would have found himself on certain issues on the side
00:42:16.560
of some of this hysterical anti-Catholicism, but he also recognized, I think, the danger of it, that
00:42:24.560
it's all well and good to call the Pope the Antichrist, but the chickens come home to roost at some point,
00:42:32.160
and he saw that that kind of anti-Catholicism had devastating effects on the politics of England.
00:42:39.360
I don't know when this so-called secularization of Western civilization takes place, but let's just assume
00:42:47.600
it's an enlightenment effect of the Enlightenment, but the question arises now in our own time,
00:42:55.920
how do things stand with apocalyptic thinking in, let's say the 20th century, in our own century,
00:43:03.600
where there has been a certain kind of abdication of any kind of truly religious belief in the
00:43:13.840
imminent end of days, but that apocalyptic patterns of thought and maybe even desires are still very
00:43:23.920
much present with us. Is that right? So we were speaking earlier about Morgenthau and his nuclear
00:43:31.920
apocalypse, which of course is slightly different than the apocalyptic phenomena that we were
00:43:39.600
discussing with Mikeviddly as well as with Hobbs, where they were talking about a god who will
00:43:45.520
intervene in history to bring about an end according to his own providential design and
00:43:52.560
intentions, as opposed to a situation now, geopolitical situation, where humanity has amassed the
00:44:00.560
means to bring about an engineer, its own apocalyptic self-diver station. That's right. So let me start by saying
00:44:10.880
we're not free of the religious apocalypticism yet. A Pew survey from 2010 suggested that
00:44:20.080
a little over 40% of Americans think that the world will come to an end within 50 years,
00:44:27.120
sort of as foretold along religious lines. So that's still with us in spite of the enlightenment.
00:44:34.240
I know I alluded to it in my intro. Exactly. But you're right, at the same time,
00:44:39.600
the apocalypses that preoccupy many of us now are wrought by human hands rather than by divine
00:44:47.840
agency. And this really is a transformation, I think, that starts with the dawn of the thermonuclear
00:44:56.640
age and the hydrogen bomb. The possibility that we now could destroy ourselves or destroy a good part
00:45:04.880
of the world comes firmly into view. At the same time, our ways of thinking about it still owe a lot
00:45:11.920
to those religious traditions of apocalyptic thinking. In the book, I talk a little bit about
00:45:18.560
some of the people who are involved in the Manhattan Project, Oppenheimer, was an obsessive reader
00:45:26.160
of the 17th century poet John Dunn. And so he was thinking of his own work on nuclear weaponry as in terms
00:45:35.040
of kind of crisis and redemption and salvation. And so one of the things I want to insist on in the
00:45:43.040
book is that the division between what we might call the religious and what we might call the
00:45:48.880
secular is very muddy in the 20th century thinking on nuclear apocalyps. It's not so clear
00:45:56.080
as we would think. Right. And clearly we're no longer in the midst of the Cold War of the 50s and 60s and even
00:46:04.560
70s. And yet, as you say, we're not maybe thinking as much about nuclear apocalyps as we might have in
00:46:15.760
the past. And yet the threat of it is still very much with us even more, perhaps, potentially than ever
00:46:22.240
before. That's true. There are still over 9,000 nuclear weapons in the hands of Putin's Russia.
00:46:31.680
There are, I think, a little less than that in the hands of Trump's America. Despite all the talk,
00:46:38.160
at the recent Summit with North Korea, about denuclearization, there's no agreement between the
00:46:42.960
US and North Korea on what that actually means. And so some number of nuclear weapons are in the
00:46:47.760
hands of Kim Jong-un. The possibility of nuclear war has not gone away, we have just ceased to think
00:46:55.440
about it as much. Does it have anything to do with our contemporary politics apart from who has the
00:47:02.480
button power or does us not thinking about it have anything to do with our contemporary politics?
00:47:08.640
It might. It might also have to do with some. Would we vote differently, for example, if we were more
00:47:15.520
present to mine? I think we might well vote differently. We might choose leaders whose attitude
00:47:24.160
toward the possibility of nuclear war was less whimsical than our current leaders seems to be.
00:47:32.800
I think, though, that part of the reason we don't think about it as much is kind of run of the
00:47:39.680
mill psychological reasons. Psychologists have suggested that humans have a finite pool of worry.
00:47:46.480
Most people, what they're worried about now in terms of existential threats, it's climate change
00:47:54.800
and not nuclear war. It doesn't mean that nuclear war has become less of a threat or that it's been
00:48:01.120
eliminated. It means we can only worry about so much at once. And climate change has taken on
00:48:06.720
a apocalyptic dimension for many people, correct? That's right. Not surprisingly. And people
00:48:13.840
trying to get us to recognize the threat of climate change have made ample use of apocalyptic rhetoric,
00:48:21.360
perhaps most famously Al Gore in an inconvenient truth. And at numerous points thereafter
00:48:27.840
says that the catastrophes, the floods, the drought, the storms, the attributes to climate change are
00:48:34.000
quote, like a nature hike through the book of Revelation. And that kind of apocalyptic rhetoric,
00:48:40.080
both in its overtly biblical and seemingly secular form, pervades the debate on climate change.
00:48:46.560
So I was thinking of a book that I was very important for me when I was, as a graduate student,
00:48:54.240
when I, but it's a theory of narrative by Frank Kermode. That's right.
00:48:59.280
The sense of an ending, you know, you're well aware of, well, familiar with that, that deals a lot with
00:49:06.000
the apocalyptic psychology of certainly, you know, the Christian era in various moments. But
00:49:12.960
it's more this, he points out how human existence is denied a beginning, a historical beginning,
00:49:21.520
and because we are all living in what he calls the meantime, he calls. I mean, it's not his word,
00:49:27.600
but it's the fact that there's a world that preceded our entry into it and will presumably outlast,
00:49:35.680
you know, our exit from it. And we don't know how this story is going to end. And yet, the demand for
00:49:42.880
meaning, which you were referring to earlier in our conversation, that something reassuring about
00:49:50.000
apocalyptic scenario, they would provide an employment with a kind of beginning middle and end that
00:49:56.480
would make sense and confers meaning on the whole story and retrospect, that because we don't have
00:50:02.000
access to such an end, narrative end from which perspective we can make meaning of our present,
00:50:08.480
that human cultures universally have narrative stories, myths, and so forth. And yet, this
00:50:18.640
narrative impulse, which he roots in our existential condition of mean timeless,
00:50:26.160
is one that I can't help but think is inseparable from an apocalyptic imaginary.
00:50:35.120
Yes, I mean, if you think about how a lot of us think about our own lives, how drawn we are,
00:50:42.960
to narrative, to telling the story of our life such that it has a beginning, middle, and hopefully
00:50:49.840
some sort of reasonably dignified end. And I mean, I do think this impulse runs strong,
00:50:57.120
and so as human societies, we spend a lot of our time living in this middle time either
00:51:03.680
trying to recover our lost origins or in trying to anticipate some sort of prophesied end.
00:51:12.960
And as you do, I think this runs extremely deep.
00:51:16.400
And so one of the most interesting claims that you make about political realists is that
00:51:22.640
they tend to have a tragic worldview, but a tragic worldview that strangely is actually
00:51:29.520
much less dangerous than an apocalyptic worldview because the tragic worldview would
00:51:37.920
begin by acknowledging the fact that we live in this middle time, that we are denied access to
00:51:45.120
an absolute end time that would give an absolute meaning to the story as such. But that there's
00:51:53.040
nothing very consoling or edifying about accepting the fact that we live within these very finite
00:52:00.400
spans that our fragments and therefore do not necessarily allow for the demand for meaning that we
00:52:10.480
bring to bear on our existence. And that therefore a tragic acceptance of limitations would be
00:52:19.280
consistent with the reality of a human existential situation, but that is also a hard sell
00:52:26.240
politically speaking, no? I think that's right. So I do argue that Machiavelli after his initial
00:52:31.920
flirtation with a sort of savanna role and style of pakalipticism gravitates in the end,
00:52:38.640
and especially in the discourses on Livi toward a more tragic worldview. And that's certainly
00:52:43.120
the worldview that Hans Morgenthau starts his career with as well that we later
00:52:49.360
departs from it. And the tragic worldview essentially sees politics as the same damn thing over and
00:52:58.240
over again. There's no hope for a final escape from the political conflicts that plague us,
00:53:04.720
there's no hope for redemption. Now, there's something quite morally appealing about that
00:53:13.840
worldview. It's not just as you suggested that it might better reflect the reality of our
00:53:18.080
condition of living in this middle time. But a tragic worldview really resists apakalipticism's
00:53:23.760
dangerous moral clarity, it's sense of certainty about who and what is good, who and what is evil.
00:53:30.720
It resists the apakaliptic impulse to push for ultimate justice at any cost. The tragic worldview
00:53:38.480
recognizes that when we see our enemies as apakaliptic threats, rather than as flawed humans who
00:53:44.560
find themselves in the same circumstances that we do, that that can be awfully dangerous. But at the same
00:53:51.520
time, you're right, it is such a hard position to hold. And it's certainly a hard position to sell.
00:53:58.960
It's a view of the world as fundamentally resistant to our mastery, as unresponsive to our
00:54:05.760
virtuous intentions, as capricious in its rewards for goodness. It is not a worldview that offers
00:54:13.360
much consolation, but it is one that's very consistent with political realism's underlying commitments.
00:54:20.400
It may in the end be the right worldview, even if it's one that offers us no consolation.
00:54:25.840
It offers us also no, it renounces what Zheeshk calls the sublime object of ideology,
00:54:32.880
which is another interesting question about the way in which apakaliptic thinking and totalitarianism,
00:54:39.280
what do they have in common, at least in a subterranean way, where the totalitarian sublime object
00:54:47.040
of ideology is that it will promise some kind of redemption if you're dealing with, let's say,
00:54:54.560
the Marxist view of it in this totalitarian instantiation, it's this utopian future of the
00:55:03.280
triumph of the proletariat, getting the communist state and so forth, or in the case of fascist totalitarianism,
00:55:11.520
there's also some other sublime object of ideology, which at the there's an end point where things
00:55:15.680
are put right again. And the tragic worldview would renounce the siren call of this kind of absolute,
00:55:26.640
and I think there's enough dignity in the call of a tragic worldview that you could actually
00:55:33.040
sell it the way someone like Albedkamu does in such an inspired manner when he writes the rebel,
00:55:40.000
yes, as where he's making a claim for rebellion versus revolution and that the revolutionaries are
00:55:47.840
promising that ultimate synthesized end and whereas the rebel has a tragic understanding of life
00:55:56.560
and therefore accepts limits and understands the principle of restraint.
00:56:01.760
Yes, I've tended to think about it in terms of the difference between resistance and
00:56:06.640
revolution and I think what the tragic worldview asks of us is that we recognize the hard work of
00:56:13.920
resistance that it is like it is as Weber called politics, the slow boring through hard boards.
00:56:23.440
That is a lot of what political resistance looks like on a day-to-day basis. It's also what a lot
00:56:28.720
of political transformation looks like so it's not that the tragic worldview it has to be a status
00:56:34.640
quo worldview. Morgenthau was fond of saying that his brand of realism didn't give up on the
00:56:41.840
project of a transformation toward international justice. It just recognized that that had to take
00:56:49.440
place through the slow workman-like processes of everyday politics. I think there is a dignity about
00:56:56.560
that that's worth celebrating and I also suggest in the book I think that the tragic worldview
00:57:06.080
has an optimism to it which is that if politics is just the same damn thing over and over again,
00:57:12.240
then we have some hope of being able to look to the past for analogs and wisdom that we can use in
00:57:20.240
the present. The apocalyptic worldview always sees our current circumstances as radically
00:57:25.600
unprecedented. There's nothing that can ever be learned from our past struggles that for
00:57:30.720
a gd in at least sees the past as a source of resources for coming to grips with the present.
00:57:37.040
Absolutely, which is why Machiavelli's prince is full of examples from the past.
00:57:42.000
For every political principle he proffers, he takes an example from antiquity and an example from
00:57:49.360
his contemporary history. That's right and the discourse is on livid as well just with a focus on
00:57:54.560
Roman examples. Well, Allison, I'm all in favor of rallying to the cause of a tragic worldview that
00:58:03.600
would spare us greater tragedies that might ensue from another kind of apocalyptic thinking
00:58:09.680
when it comes to the political realm. I want to thank you for coming on to entitled opinions
00:58:15.040
and remind our listeners we've been speaking with Professor Allison McQueen from
00:58:19.600
Department of Political Science here at Stanford just published a very provocative book,
00:58:27.120
very interesting book called political realism in apocalyptic times Cambridge University Press
00:58:31.840
2018, right? That's right. Yeah, it's hot off the press. Hot off the press and it's
00:58:38.320
well worth reading. So thanks again for coming on. I'm Robert Harrison for entitled opinions. Take care.
00:58:46.000
[Music] I can see what you're looking to find in a smile on my face.
00:59:11.360
[Music] In my face and mind, my state of grace, I send what I came to make from the madness to me.
00:59:34.000
[Music]
00:59:44.000
With a diamond ring, with a ball of heaven's plan, yeah, and you sure can't save.
00:59:56.720
Now it's all I can fall, but the load is sent me down into me.
01:00:09.040
I can save a little children in a poor country.
01:00:15.040
Got my teeth in heaven, never left in life.
01:00:21.280
We've got to ride all the way to pay for a dime. Got my teeth in play.
01:00:35.840
Never left in life.
01:00:39.840
All the way to paradise.
01:00:51.760
[Music]
01:00:55.760
[Music]
01:01:24.160
Now there's nothing left full luxury. Nothing left to pay my life and build.
01:01:28.960
But the good lord will provide. I'm the way with it.
01:01:39.360
So said what you came to the man will die on the way.
01:01:52.000
We've tuned in a call for the man to hear him sing.
01:01:58.000
I've got my teeth in play, never left in life.
01:02:08.400
Got to ride all the way to paradise.
01:02:16.400
Got my teeth in play.
01:02:20.400
I've never left in life.
01:02:24.400
All the way to paradise.
01:02:32.400
All the way to paradise.
01:02:36.400
[Music]
01:02:40.400
[Music]
01:02:44.400
[Music]
01:02:46.400
[Music]
01:02:48.400
[Music]
01:02:50.400
[Music]
01:02:52.400
[Music]
01:02:54.400
[Music]
01:02:56.400
[Music]
01:02:58.400
[Music]
01:03:00.400
[Music]
01:03:02.400
[Music]
01:03:06.400
[Music]
01:03:08.400
I would say that the P